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Abstract
Wagering mechanisms are one-shot betting mechanisms that elicit agents’ predictions of an event.
For deterministic wagering mechanisms, an existing impossibility result has shown incompatibility of
some desirable theoretical properties. In particular, Pareto optimality (no profitable side bet before alloca-
tion) can not be achieved together with weak incentive compatibility, weak budget balance and individual
rationality. In this paper, we expand the design space of wagering mechanisms to allow randomization
and ask whether there are randomized wagering mechanisms that can achieve all previously considered
desirable properties, including Pareto optimality. We answer this question positively with two classes
of randomized wagering mechanisms: i) one simple randomized lottery-type implementation of exist-
ing deterministic wagering mechanisms, and ii) another family of randomized wagering mechanisms,
named surrogate wagering mechanisms, which are robust to noisy ground truth. Surrogate wagering
mechanisms are inspired by an idea of learning with noisy labels (Natarajan et al., 2013) as well as a
recent extension of this idea to the information elicitation without verification setting (Liu and Chen,
2018). We show that a broad set of randomized wagering mechanisms satisfy all desirable theoretical
properties.
1 Introduction
Wagering mechanisms (Lambert et al., 2008, 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Freeman et al., 2017; Freeman and Pennock,
2018) are one-shot betting mechanisms that allow a principal to elicit participating agents’ beliefs about an
event of interest without paying out of pocket or incurring a risk. Compared with prediction-market type
of dynamic elicitation mechanisms, one-shot wagering is possibly preferred due to its simplicity. It is par-
ticularly designed for agents with immutable beliefs who “agree to disagree” and who do not update their
beliefs. In a wagering mechanism, each agent submits a prediction for the event and specifies a wager, which
is the maximum amount of money that the agent is willing to lose. Then after the event outcome is revealed,
the total wagered money will be redistributed among the participants. Researchers have developed wager-
ing mechanisms with various theoretical properties. In particular, Lambert et al. (2008; 2015) proposed a
class of weighted score wagering mechanisms (WSWM) that satisfy a set of desirable properties, including
budget balance, individual rationality, incentive compatibility, sybilproofness, among others.1 Chen et al.
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Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), via 2017-17061500006. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of
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1Definitions of some properties can be found in Section 4.
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(2014) later proposed a no-arbitrage wagering mechanism (NAWM) that removes opportunities for partici-
pating agents to risklessly profit.
However, in both WSWM and NAWM, it has been observed that a participant only loses a very small
fraction of his total wager even in the worst case. This seems to be undesirable in practice as it is against
the spirit of betting and a wager effectively loses its meaning as a budget. Freeman et al. (2017) first for-
malized this observation by indicating that these mechanisms are not Pareto optimal, where Pareto opti-
mality requires that there is no profitable side bet among participants before the allocation of a wager-
ing mechanism is realized. They also proved an impossibility result: Pareto optimality cannot be satis-
fied together with individual rationality, weak budget balance and weak incentive compatibility. A dou-
ble clinching auction (DCA) wagering mechanism (Freeman et al., 2017) was hence proposed to improve
Pareto efficiency. The parimutuel consensus mechanism (PCM) has been shown to satisfy Pareto optimality
(Freeman and Pennock, 2018), but violates incentive compatibility.
This paper is another quest of wagering mechanisms with better theoretical properties. We expand the
design space of wagering mechanisms to allow randomization on agent payoffs and ask whether we can
achieve all aforementioned desirable properties, including Pareto optimality. We give a positive answer to
this question: Our randomized wagering mechanisms are the first ones to achieve Pareto optimality along
with other properties.
We first show that a simple randomized lottery-type implementation of existing wagering mechanisms
(Lottery Wagering Mechanisms (LWM)) satisfy all desirable properties. In LWM, instead of receiving re-
allocated money from a deterministic wagering mechanism, each agent receives a number of lottery tickets
proportional to his payoff in the deterministic wagering mechanism. Then, the agent with the winning lottery
wins the total wager (collected from all participants).
We then design another family of randomized wagering mechanisms, the Surrogate Wagering Mecha-
nisms (SWM), by bringing insights from learning with noisy data (Natarajan et al., 2013; Scott, 2015) to
wagering mechanism design. A SWM first generates a “surrogate outcome" for each agent according to the
true event outcome. An agent’s reported prediction is then evaluated using his surrogate but biased outcome
together with a bias removal procedure such that in expectation the agent receives a score as if his prediction
is evaluated against the true event outcome. Despite being randomized, SWM preserve the incentive proper-
ties of a deterministic wagering mechanism. We show that certain SWM satisfy all desirable properties of a
wagering mechanism. Notably, SWM are robust to situations where only a noisy copy of the event outcome
is available - this property is due to the fact that we borrow the machinery from the literature of learning
with noisy data in designing SWM. We believe that this is another unique contribution to the literature of
wagering mechanism design.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss relevant literature in the Section 2. Section 3
introduces some preliminaries. We define randomized wagering mechanisms as well as desirable theoretical
properties for them in Section 4. Section 5 presents a family of lottery-based wagering mechanisms. A family
of surrogate wagering mechanisms are introduced in Section 6. We extend surrogate wagering mechanisms
on NAWM and on the multi-outcome event settings in Section 7. Extensive simulations are presented in
Section 8 to demonstrate the advantages of randomized wagering mechanisms. Section 9 concludes this
paper.
2 Related works
The ability to elicit information, in particular predictions and forecasts about future events, is crucial for
many application settings and has been studied extensively in the literature. Proper scoring rules have been
designed (Brier, 1950; Jose et al., 2006; Matheson and Winkler, 1976; Winkler, 1969; Gneiting and Raftery,
2007) for this purpose, where each agent is rewarded by how well their reported forecasts predicted the true
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realized outcome (after the outcome is resolved). Later, competitive scoring rule (Kilgour and Gerchak,
2004) and a parimutuel Kelly probability scoring rule (Johnstone, 2007) adapt proper scoring rules to
group competitive betting. Both mechanisms are budget balanced so that the principal doesn’t need to
pay any participant. These spur the further development of the previously discussed wagering mechanisms
(Lambert et al., 2008, 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Freeman et al., 2017; Freeman and Pennock, 2018) and the
examination of their theoretical properties.
Our method used in lottery wagering mechanisms to transfer an arbitrary deterministic wagering mech-
anism into a randomized one, while maintaining the properties, is inspired by the method proposed in
(Witkowski et al., 2018). The paper studies the incentive compatible forecasting competition and it trans-
fers scores of multiple predictions into the odds of winning to maintain properties of the scoring rules.
(Lambert et al., 2008) proposed a randomization method based on WSWM via randomly selecting strictly
proper scoring rules and proper scoring rules with extreme values to increase the stake. However, this method
does not generalize to other deterministic wagering mechanisms. (Cummings et al., 2016) proposed to apply
differential privacy technology to randomize the payoff of wagering mechanisms in order to preserve the
privacy of each agent’s belief. However, their method does not maintain budget balance (in ex-post).
The idea of using randomization in wagering mechanism design is not entirely new, but not thoroughly
studied. Both (Lambert et al., 2008; Cummings et al., 2016) proposed certain types of randomized wagering
mechanisms, but neither of the mechanisms satisfies Pareto optimality. The randomized wagering mecha-
nisms first appeared in (Lambert et al., 2008). There, the randomization is restricted to randomly selecting
different scoring rules used in WSWM. It introduced this randomization in order to alleviate the the problem
that in WSWM, agents only lose a small fraction of their wagers regardless of the event outcome. However,
even with this randomization, an agent won’t lose all his wager in the worst when the number of agents is
finite. (Cummings et al., 2016) applied differential privacy technology to randomize the payoff of wagering
mechanisms. Its goal is to preserve the privacy of agents’ beliefs.
Our specific ideas of adding randomness as in the lottery-like wagering mechanisms are inspired by
recent works on forecasting competition (Witkowski et al., 2018). Our ideas of surrogate wagering mecha-
nisms are inspired by surrogate scoring rules (Liu and Chen, 2018), and the literature on learning with noisy
labels (Bylander, 1994; Natarajan et al., 2013; Scott, 2015).
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we explain the scenario where a wagering mechanism applies and formally introduce the
deterministic wagering mechanisms. Consider a scenario where a principal is interested in eliciting sub-
jective beliefs from a set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., N} about a random variable (event) X, which takes a
value (outcome) in set X = {0, 1, ...,M − 1},M ≥ 2. The belief of each agent i is private, denoted as a
vector of occurrence probabilities of each outcome pi = (p
j
i )j∈X ∈ ∆
M−1. Following the previous work
on wagering mechanism, this paper continues to adopt an immutable belief model for agents. Unlike in a
Bayesian model, agents with immutable beliefs do not update their beliefs. The immutable belief model
and the Bayesian model are two extremes of agent modeling for information elicitation, with the reality
lies in between and arguably closer to the immutable belief side as people do “agree to disagree.” More-
over, Lambert et al. (2015) showed that while WSWM was designed for agents with immutable beliefs, it
continued to perform well for Bayesian agents who have some innate utility for trading.
The principal uses a wagering mechanism to elicit private beliefs of agents. In a wagering mechanism,
each agent reports a probability vector pˆi ∈ ∆
M−1, capturing his belief, and wagers an amount of money
wi ∈ R+. Similar to Lambert et al. (2008), we assume that wagers are exogenously determined for each
agent and are not a strategic consideration. We use pˆ and w to denote the reports and the wagers of all
agents respectively, and use pˆ−i and w−i to denote the reports and wagers of all agents other than agent i.
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In addition, we use WS to denote
∑
i∈S wi for any set of agents S ⊆ N . After an event outcome x ∈ X
is realized, the wagering mechanism redistributes all the wagers collected from agents according to pˆ,w, x.
The net-payoff of agent i is defined as the payoff or the money that agent i receives from the redistribution
minus his wager. A wagering mechanism defines a net-payoff function Πi(pˆ;w;x) for each agent i with
wager constraint Πi(pˆ;w;x) ≥ −wi and constraint Πi(pˆ;w;x) = 0 whenever wi = 0. The two constraints
ensure that no agent can lose more than his wager and no agent with zero wager can gain.
3.1 Strictly proper scoring rules and weighted score wagering mechanisms
Strictly proper scoring rules (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007) are scoring functions proposed and developed
to truthfully elicit beliefs from risk-neutral agents. They are building blocks of many incentive compatible
wagering mechanisms, such as WSWM and NAWM. A strictly proper scoring rule rewards a prediction pˆi
by a score sx(pˆi), according to the realization x of the random variable X. The scoring function sx(·) is
designed such that the expected payoff of truthful reporting is strictly larger than that of any other report,
i.e, EX∼pi
[
sX(pi)
]
> EX∼pi
[
sX(pˆi)
]
, ∀pˆi 6= pi.
There is a rich family of strictly proper scoring functions, including Brier scores (for binary outcome
event, sx(pˆi) = 1− (pˆi − x)
2, where pˆi is agent i’s report of P(X = 1)), logarithmic and spherical scoring
functions. Strictly proper scoring rules are closed under positive affine transformations.
WSWM (Lambert et al., 2008) rewards an agent according to his wager and the accuracy of his predic-
tion relative to that of other agents’ predictions. The net-payoff of agent i in WSWM, is formally defined
as
ΠWSi (pˆ;w;x) =
wiWN\{i}
WN
(
sx(pˆi)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN\{i}
sx(pˆj)
)
, (1)
where sx(·) is any strictly proper scoring rule bounded within [0, 1]. WSWM strictly encourages truthful
reporting of predictions, because the net-payoff of agent i is a strictly proper scoring rule of his prediction.
Meanwhile,
∑
i∈N Π
WS
i is always zero by the form of the net-payoff formula, no matter what sx(·) is.
This means that the budget balance property of Eqn. (1) doesn’t depend on the scoring rules. Our proposed
surrogate wagering mechanisms use the same general form of the net-payoff function (but a different scoring
rule) to guarantee the ex-post budget balance.
4 Randomized wagering mechanisms
We introduce randomized wagering mechanisms as extensions of deterministic wagering mechanisms. Sim-
ilar to deterministic wagering mechanisms, the net-payoff of an agent in randomized wagering mechanisms
depends on all agents’ predictions pˆ and wagers w, as well as the realized outcome x. But different from
deterministic wagering mechanisms, the net-payoffs are now random variables. For notational simplicity,
we now use Πi(pˆ;w;x) to represent the random variable of agent i’s net-payoff in a randomized wagering
mechanism. We use pii(pˆ;w;x) to represent the realization of Πi(pˆ;w;x). We use Πi and pii as abbrevia-
tions when pˆ;w;x are clear in the context. We denote the maximum/minimum possible value of a random
variable X byX/X . We denote the joint distribution of Πi(pˆ;w;x), i ∈ N by D(pˆ;w;x) and the marginal
distribution of Πi(pˆ;w;x) by Di(pˆ;w;x).
Definition 1. Given a set N of agents, reports pˆ and wagers w of agents and the event outcome x, a
randomized wagering mechanism defines a joint distribution D(pˆ;w;x), and pays agent i by a net-payoff
Πi(pˆ;w;x), where Πi(pˆ;w;x), i ∈ N are jointly drawn from D(pˆ;w;x). Moreover, Πi(pˆ;w;x) ≥ −wi
and Πi(pˆ;w;x) = 0 whenever wi = 0.
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A deterministic wagering mechanism is a special case of randomized wagering mechanisms when
Di(pˆ;w;x) is a point distribution for all agent i ∈ N .
4.1 Desirable properties
In the literature, several desirable properties of wagering mechanisms have been proposed in the deter-
ministic context. Lambert et al. (2008) introduced (a) individual rationality, (b) incentive compatibility, (c)
budget balance, (d) sybilproofness, (e) anonymity,and (f) neutrality. Chen et al. (2014) introduced (g) no
arbitrage. Freeman et al. (2017) introduced (h) Pareto optimality. We extend these properties to the random-
ized context. These new properties reduce to the properties defined in the literature for the special case of
deterministic wagering mechanisms.
(a) Individual rationality requires that each agent has nothing to lose in expectation by participating.
Definition 2. A randomized wagering mechanism is individually rational (IR) if ∀i,pi,w, and pˆ−i, there
exists pˆi such that
EX∼pi,Πi∼Di(pˆi,pˆ−i;w;X)
[
Πi(pˆi, pˆ−i;w;X)
]
≥ 0.
(b) Incentive compatibility requires that an agent’s expected net-payoff is maximized when he reports
honestly, regardless of other agents’ reports and wagers.
Definition 3. A randomized wagering mechanism is weakly incentive compatible (WIC) if ∀i,pi, pˆi 6=
pi, pˆ−i,w :
EX∼pi,Πi∼Di(pi,pˆ−i;w;X)
[
Πi(pi, pˆ−i;w;X)
]
≥ EX∼pi,Πi∼Di(pˆ;w;X) [Πi(pˆ;w;X)] .
A randomized wagering mechanism is strictly incentive compatible (SIC) if the inequality is strict.
(c) Ex-post budget balance ensures that the principal does not need to subsidize the betting.
Definition 4. A randomized wagering mechanism is weakly ex-post budget-balanced (WEBB) if ∀pˆ,w, x :∑
i∈N pii(pˆ,w, x) ≤ 0 for any realization (pii)i∈N drawn from the joint distribution D(pˆ,w, x). A random-
ized wagering mechanism is ex-post budget-balanced (EBB) if the equality always holds.
(d) Sybilproofness requires that no agent can increase its expected net-payoff by creating fake identities
and splitting his wager, regardless of other agents’ reports and wagers.
Definition 5. Suppose agent i, instead of participating under one account with reported prediction pˆi and
wager wi, participates under k > 1 sybil accounts, with predictions and wagers {pˆil , wil}l=1,...,k such that
pˆil = pˆi, wil ≥ 0,∀l = 1, . . . , k and
∑k
l=1wil = wi. A randomized wagering mechanism is sybilproof if
∀i, pˆ,w,and x, and for all sybil reports pˆi1 , ..., pˆik and wagers wi1 , ..., wik , we have
EΠ∼D(pˆ;w;x)[Πi(pˆ;w;x)]
≥ EΠ′∼D(pˆ′;w′;x)
[ k∑
l=1
Πil(pˆ
′;w′;x)
]
.
where pˆ,w and Π are the reports, wagers and net-payoffs when agent i participates under one account and
pˆ′, w′ and Π′ are the reports, wagers and net-payoffs when agent i participates using k sybils.
(e) Anonymity requires that agents’ identities do not affect their net-payoffs. Let σN be a permutation
of the set of agentsN , and denote pˆσN ,wσN the reports and wagers of agents after applying the permutation
respectively. Denote DσN the joint distribution of net-payoffs of agents inN after applying the permutation
on agents.
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Table 1: A summary of properties of wagering mechanisms
Budget Incentive Pareto No
Mechanism Balance Compatibility Optimality Arbitrage
WSWM (Lambert et al., 2008) Strictly Strictly False False
NAWM (Chen et al., 2014) Weakly Strictly False True
DCA (Freeman et al., 2017) Strictly Weakly False True
PCM (Freeman and Pennock, 2018) Strictly False True True
Randomized WSWM (Lambert et al., 2008) Strictly True False True
Private WSWM (Cummings et al., 2016) False True False True
LWS (this paper) Strictly True True True
RP-SWME (this paper) Strictly True True True
(All of the mechanisms in this table satisfy individual rationality, anonymity, neutrality and sybilproofness.)
Definition 6. A randomized wagering mechanism is anonymous if ∀σN , pˆ,w, x : D(pˆ;w;x) = DσN (pˆσN ;wσN ;x)
(f) Neutrality requires that the net-payoffs do not depend on the labeling of the event outcomes. Let
σM be a permutation of the set of outcomes M. Denote by pˆ
σM
i the reported prediction of agent i after
we relabel the outcomes according to permutation σM, and denote by σM(x) the new label of an outcome
x ∈ M.
Definition 7. A randomized wagering mechanism is neutral if ∀σM, pˆ,w, x :
D(pˆ;w;x) = D(pˆσM1 , ..., pˆ
σM
N ;w;σM(x)).
(g) No arbitrage requires that no agent can risklessly make a profit.
Definition 8. A randomized wagering mechanism has no arbitrage if ∀i, pˆ,w(w > 0),∃x such that
Πi(pˆ,w, x) < 0.
(h) Pareto optimality in economics refers to an efficient situation where no trade can be made to im-
prove an agent’s payoff without harming any other agent’s payoff. In an IR wagering mechanism, agents
with different beliefs can always form a profitable (in expectation) wagering game if they all have a positive
budget. Freeman et al. (2017) defined Pareto optimality of a wagering mechanism as a property that agents
with different beliefs will each lose all of his wager under at least one of the event outcomes. This “worst-
case" outcome might be different for different agents. Thus, before the event outcome is realized, no agent
can commit to secure part of his wager from the mechanism and no additional profitable wagering game can
be made. We define Pareto optimality for randomized wagering mechanisms in a similar spirit: no agents
with different beliefs can commit to secure part of their wagers before the event outcome is realized.
Definition 9. A randomized wagering mechanism is Pareto optimal (PO) if ∀pˆ,w,∀i, j ∈ N with pˆi 6=
pˆj ,∃l ∈ {i, j} and x, such that Πl(pˆ,w, x) = −wl.
Properties of existing wagering mechanisms We summarize the properties of existing wagering mecha-
nisms2 and ours in Table 1. No existing mechanism satisfies all properties (a)-(h). Moreover, Freeman et al.
(2017) showed an impossibility result that for deterministic wagering mechanisms, it is impossible to
achieve properties IR, WIC, WEBB, and PO simultaneously. For existing randomized wagering mecha-
nisms, the randomized WSWM in (Lambert et al., 2008) only satisfies PO in the limit of large population of
participants, and the private WSWM (Cummings et al., 2016) does not satisfy WEBB and PO.
2
WSWM, NAWM, DCA, PCM, randomized WSWM (Lambert et al., 2008), private WSWM (Cummings et al., 2016)
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5 Lottery wagering mechanisms
In this section we introduce a family of randomized wagering mechanisms, the lottery wagering mechanisms
(LWM), which extends arbitrary deterministic wagering mechanisms into randomized wagering mecha-
nisms. We will show that LWM easily preserve (the randomized version of) the properties of the underlying
deterministic wagering mechanisms, while achieving Pareto optimality, overcoming the impossibility result.
In lottery wagering mechanisms, each agent receives a number of lottery tickets in proportion to the
payoff he gets under a deterministic wagering mechanism, and a winner is drawn from all the lottery tickets
to win the entire pool of wagers. The mechanisms are designed in a way such that the expected payoff of
each agent is equal to his payoff in the underlying deterministic wagering mechanisms and each agent has
a positive probability to lose all his wager. Hence, no profitable side bet exists and the mechanisms are
Pareto optimal. We formally present the lottery wagering mechanism that extends an arbitrary deterministic
wagering mechanism DET in Mechanism 1. To distinguish the payoff from the net-payoff, we denote the
payoff of agent i by pi′i .
Mechanism 1 Lottery Wagering Mechanisms
1: Compute the payoff of each agent i under a DET: pi′i ← wi +Πi(pˆ;w;x).
2: Each agent has winning probability
pi′j∑
i∈N pi
′
j
. Draw a lottery winner i∗ ∈ N .
3: Winner i∗ is assigned a net-payoff
∑
i∈N\{i∗} wi and any agent j 6= i
∗ has a net-payoff −wj .
Lottery wagering mechanisms are powerful in obtaining desirable theoretical properties. We show in
Theorem 1 that the lottery wagering mechanism that extends WSWM, namely Lottery Weighted Score
wagering mechanism (LWS), satisfies all properties (a)-(h).
Theorem 1. LWS satisfies all properties (a) - (h).
We notice that although LWS satisfies all desirable properties, it can be unsatisfying because (1) agents
have high variance in payoff and (2) except the winning agent, all other agents lose money. To alleviate
these issues, we can mix LWS with WSWM by assigning each of them a probability to be executed. The
resulting mechanism still satisfies all the properties (a)-(h). The probabilistic mixture allows us to adjust the
variance of the payoffs as well as agents’ winning probabilities in the resulting mechanism.
6 Surrogate wagering mechanisms
In this section, we propose the surrogate wagering mechanisms (SWM). We first introduce the generic
SWM, then a variant of SWM that achieves the desirable theoretical properties and at the same time have
moderate variance in payoffs and higher winning probabilities for accurate predictions. We then notice that
randomization opens up the possibility of dealing with situations where only noisy ground truth is available.
We discuss how to extend our results to this noisy setting.
6.1 Generic surrogate wagering mechanisms
A surrogate wagering mechanism consists of three main steps: (1) SWM generates a surrogate event out-
come for each agent based on the true event outcome and a randomization device; (2) SWM evaluates each
agent’s prediction according to the surrogate event outcome using a designed scoring function such that the
score is an unbiased estimate of the score derived by applying a strictly proper scoring rule to the ground
truth outcome; (3) SWM applies WSWM to the scores based on the surrogate event outcome to determine
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Mechanism 2 Surrogate Wagering Mechanisms
1: Collect the predictions pˆ and wagers w.
2: Select error rate ei0, e
i
1 ∈ [0, 1] and e
i
0 + e
i
1 6= 1,∀i.
3: Generate surrogate outcome X˜i,∀i such that P(X˜i = 1|X = 0) = e
i
0, P(X˜i = 0|X = 1) = e
i
1.
4: Score each agent i ∈ N according to Eqn. (2).
5: Pay each agent i ∈ N a net-payoff using Eqn. (3).
the final net-payoff of each agent. Next, we explain these three steps in details. For clarity and simplicity
of exposition, we consider only binary events, i.e., X = {0, 1}, in this section. Extension to multi-outcome
events will be introduced later.
Step 1. Surrogate event outcomes A SWM generates a surrogate event outcome X˜i for each agent i ∈ N .
Denote X˜ = (X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜N ). X˜i’s are drawn independently conditional onX, and are specified by SWM.
The conditionally marginal distribution P(X˜i|X), i ∈ N can be expressed by two parameters, the error rates
of the surrogate outcome: ei1 = P(X˜i = 0|X = 1) and e
i
0 = P(X˜i = 1|X = 0). The conditionally marginal
distribution P(X˜i|X) can be any distribution satisfying ∀i ∈ N : e
i
1 + e
i
0 6= 1.
3 We use x˜ and x˜i to denote
the realization of X˜ and X˜i respectively.
Step 2. Computing unbiased scores Given a strictly proper scoring rule sx(·) within [0,1], SWM com-
putes the score of agent i as ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi), where
ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi) =
(1 − ei1−x˜i)sx˜i(pˆi)− e
i
x˜i
s1−x˜i(pˆi)
1− ei0 − e
i
1
. (2)
x˜i is the realized surrogate event outcome for agent i. Lemma 1 shows that ϕ is an unbiased operator on the score
sx˜i(pi) in the sense that EX˜i|x[ϕ ◦ sX˜i(pˆi)] = sx(pˆi).
Lemma 1 (Lemma 3.4 of (Liu and Chen, 2018)). ∀x ∈ {0, 1}, ∀pˆi, ei0, e
i
1 ∈ [0, 1] and e
i
0+e
i
1 6= 1, we have EX˜i|x[ϕ◦
sX˜i(pˆi)] = sx(pˆi).
Lemma 1 implies that if sx(pˆi) is a strictly proper scoring rule, then ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi) is also a strictly proper scoring
rule.
Step 3. Computing net-payoffs In the final step, SWM computes the net-payoff of agent i using WSWM and
the unbiased score of agent i, i.e., replacing score sx(pˆi) in Eqn. (1) by score ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi). Formally, we have
ΠSWMi (pˆ,w, x) =
wiWN\{i}
WN
(
ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN\{i}
ϕ ◦ sx˜j(pˆj)
)
, (3)
where x and x˜i, i ∈ N are the event outcome and the surrogate event outcome for each agent i respectively.
We formally present SWM in Mechanism 2. According to Lemma 1 (applying to each score terms), we have
∀i, x, pˆ,w : EΠSWM
i
∼D(pˆ;w;x)[Π
SWM
i (pˆ;w;x)] = Π
WS
i (pˆ;w;x). Because the deterministic WSWM satisfies proper-
ties ((a)-(f)) (Lambert et al., 2008), SWM also satisfies these properties. A realization of the score ϕ ◦ sX˜i(pi) can
be larger than 1, implying that agent i can lose (or win) more than what he can lose (or win) in the deterministic
WSWM. However, we also notice that for some extreme values of error rates, the constraint Πi(pˆ;w;x) ≥ −wi can
be violated4, i.e., an agent may lose more than his wager, which makes SWM invalid. In the next section, we show that
by selecting error rates in a subtle way, we can obtain all the properties (a)-(h) without violating the wager constraint
Πi(pˆ;w;x) ≥ −wi.
3When e0 + e1 = 1, X˜i turns out to be independent with X , and thus provides no information about X . We thus exclude
ei1 + e
i
0 = 1.
4For example, in a wagering game, two agents both wager 1 and report 1 and 0, respectively. Let sx(pˆi) = 1− (x− pˆi)
2, eij =
0.4, i = 1, 2, j = 0, 1. In the worst case of agent 1, the surrogate outcomes are realized as x˜1 = 0, x˜2 = 1. Then, pi1 = −5 < −1.
8
6.2 SWM with Error rate selection (SWME) and random partition SWME (RP-SWME)
We notice that according to Corollary 1, no matter which error rates e0, e1 are chosen, the unbiasedness property of
SWM holds, i.e., EΠi∼D(pˆ;w;x)[Π
SWM
i (pˆ;w;x)] = Π
WSWM
i (pˆ;w;x). In other words, we can choose the error rates in
an arbitrary way (even in an ex-post way) without changing the expected net-payoff5 of each agent under any realized
event outcome. This gives us the flexibility to tune the maximal amount of money each agent can win or lose in the
game, while preserving the properties ((a)-(f)) inherited from WSWM.
Given reports pˆ and wagers w but not the event outcome x, the error rate pair that guarantees no wager violation
under any outcome x ∈ X and any realization of the randomness induced by SWM may not be unique. We propose
Algorithm 3 to select a pair of error rates e0, e1 after the reports and wagers are collected, such that at least one
agent loses all his wager in the worst case of the outcome and the realization of randomness in SWM. We name the
mechanisms SWME when we use Algorithm 3 to select the error rates for SWM.
6.3 SWM with Error rate selection (SWME) and random partition SWME (RP-SWME)
We notice that according to Lemma 1, no matter which error rates e0, e1 are chosen, the unbiasedness property of
SWM holds, i.e., EΠi∼D(pˆ;w;x)[Π
SWM
i (pˆ;w;x)] = Π
WSWM
i (pˆ;w;x). In other words, we can choose the error rates in
an arbitrary way (even depending on pˆ,w) without changing the expected net-payoff6 of each agent under any realized
event outcome. This gives us the flexibility to tune the maximum amount of money each agent can win or lose in the
game, while preserving the properties ((a)-(f)) inherited from WSWM.
Given reports pˆ and wagers w but not the event outcome x, the error rate pair that guarantees no wager violation
under any outcome x ∈ X and any realization of the randomness induced by SWM may not be unique. We propose
Algorithm 3 to select a pair of error rates e0, e1 after the reports and wagers are collected, such that at least one agent
loses all his wager in the worst case w.r.t. the outcome and the randomness of SWM. We name the mechanism as
SWME when we use Algorithm 3 to select the error rates for SWM.
Algorithm 3 Error Rate Selection Algorithm
1: Collect the predictions pˆ and wagers w.
2: ∀i: swi ← minx∈X sx(pˆi), s
b
i ← maxx∈X sx(pˆi).
3: For each agent i ∈ N , compute ri: ri ←
1
2 +
(1−
wi
WN
)(swi −s
b
i )+
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN
(swj −s
b
j)
2(2+swi +s
b
i−
∑
j∈N
wj
wN
(swj +s
b
j))
4: If minj∈N {rj} = 0.5, set e
i
1 = e
i
0 = 0,∀i, else set e
i
1 = e
i
0 = minj∈N{rj},∀i.
Lemma 2. SWME has no wager violation and when there exists at least one report pˆi 6= 0.5, at least one of the
agents loses all his wager in the worst case w.r.t. the event outcome and the randomness of SWME.
Proof. In this proof, we use Brier Score as the scoring rule used by the mechanism, i.e., sx(pˆi) = 1− (x− pˆi)2, and
pˆi is agent i’s report of P(X = 1). The proof can be extended to other strictly proper scoring rule within [0, 1].
We first consider the corner case where all agents reports 0.5. It can be verified that in Algorithm 2,mini∈N ri =
0.5, and the algorithm sets ei0 = e
i
1 = 0, ∀i and SWME is reduced to WSWM. Thus, no wager violation happens.
Next, we consider the scenario that ∃i ∈ N , pˆ 6= 0.5. In this scenario, we first prove that, in Algorithm 2 ∀i, ri ∈
(0, 0.5).
We have ∀i, swi , s
b
i ∈ [0, 1], s
w
i ≤ s
b
i (the equality only holds when pˆi = 0.5), s
w
i + s
b
i ∈ [0.5, 1]. Let
A = (1−
wi
WN
)swi −
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN
sbj
and
B = (1 −
wi
WN
)(swi + s
b
i)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN
(swj + s
b
j).
5The expectation is taken over the randomness of the mechanism conditioned on the event outcome.
6The expectation is taken over the randomness of the mechanism conditioned on the event outcome.
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We have ri =
1
2 +
2A−B
2(2+B) , A > −1, B ∈ (−1, 1) and 2A−B =
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN
(swj − s
b
j)+ (1−
wi
WN
)(swi − s
b
j) > 0
(there exists at least one agent i ∈ N that pˆi 6= 0.5). Therefore,
2A−B
2+B ∈ (−1, 0). We have ri =
1
2+
2A−B
2(2+B) ∈ (0, 0.5).
Next, we prove that if let ri be a variable, and let e
i
0 = e
i
1 = ri, the worst cast net-payoff pi
w
i (w.r.t. the event
outcome and the randomness of the mechanism) of agent i is a decreasing function of ri.
In the worst case of agent i, ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi) =
(1−ri)swi −risbi
1−2ri , ϕ ◦ sx˜j (pˆj) =
(1−ri)sbi−riswi
1−2ri and pi
w
i = wi
(A−Bri)
1−2ri . We
have
∂piwi
∂ri
= wi
2A−B
(1−2ri)2 < 0. Therefore, pi
w
i is decreasing with ri.
Finally, it is easy to verify that when ri =
1
2 +
2A−B
2(2+B) , pi
w
i = −wi.
Therefore, when we set for each agent i ∈ N , e0i = e
1
i = minj∈N rj , no agent can lose more than his wager and
agent i∗ = argminj∈N rj loses all his wager in the worst case.
Note Lemma 2 does not imply PO for SWME - if there exist two agents who have different predictions and have
wager left even in their own worst cases, they can form a profitable bet against each other. We propose a variant of
SWME to fix this caveat as follows.
Random partition SWME (RP-SWME) Lemma 2 implies that when agents are partitioned into groups of two,
there will not exist side bets. Meanwhile, a smaller number of agents imposes less restrictions in selecting the error
rates, and thus each agent’s wager can be fully leveraged in the randomization step. We would like to note that this
is a very unique property of SWME: as both shown in Freeman et al. (2017) and our experimental results, when the
number of agents is small, existing wagering mechanisms (including DCA) all have low risk, i.e., have only a small
portion of wager to lose in the worst case. This not only implies that SWME is particularly suitable for small group
wagering but also points out a way to further improve the risk property of SWME, i.e. via randomly partitioning agents
into smaller groups. We formally present the random partition SWME in Mechanism 4. We show in next section that
RP-SWME achieves all properties (a)-(h).
Mechanism 4 Random Partition SWME (RP-SWME)
1: Partition agents into groups of two. If N is odd, leave one group with three agents.
2: Run SWME for each group.
6.4 Properties of SWME and RP-SWME
Theorem 2. Both (SWME) and (RP-SWME) satisfy properties (a)-(g). (RP-SWME) satisfies (h).
Proof. We prove the properties one by one.
(a) Individual rationality and (b) (strictly) incentive compatibility: First considerSWME. For an arbitrary
profile of reports pˆ and wagers w, Algorithm 3 outputs a profile E of error rates of all agents. Denote by ϕˆiE(·) the
corresponding surrogate function specified using the error rate profile E for agent i. For each i and j ∈ N :
EX∼pi,X˜j
[
ϕˆjE ◦ sX˜j (pˆj)
]
=piEX˜j |X=1[ϕˆ
j
E ◦ sX˜j (pˆj)] + (1− pi)EX˜j |X=0[ϕˆ
j
E ◦ sX˜j (pˆj)]
=pi · sX=1(pˆj) + (1− pi) · sX=0(pˆj) = EX∼pi [sX(pˆj)],
using Lemma 1. Then, using the linearity of expectation, we have (here X˜ encodes the randomness in ΠSWMEi )
EX∼pi,X˜
[
ΠSWMEi (pˆ,w, X)
]
=
wiWN\{i}
WN
(
EX∼pi,X˜i [ϕˆ
i
E ◦ sX˜i(pˆi)]−
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN\{i}
EX∼pi,X˜j [ϕˆ
j
E ◦ sX˜j (pˆj)]
)
=EX∼pi
[
wiWN\{i}
WN
(
sX(pˆi)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN\{i}
sX(pˆj)
)]
=EX∼pi
[
ΠWSi (pˆ,w, X)
]
.
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Note the above holds for any possible reports (∀E). Thus the incentive properties, i.e., individual rationality and
strictly incentive compatibility of WSWM will preserve. The proof for RP-SWME is similar, with the only difference
in that each agent’s net-payoff is further averaged over the random partitions (but IR and SIC under each possible
partition).
(c) Ex-post budget balance: This can be shown via writing down the sum of net-payoffs defined in Eqn. (3). Our
note below Eqn. (1) also states that the budget balance property doesn’t depend on the specific forms of the scoring
functions therein. We formally present the deduction as follows:
∑
i
ΠSWMEi (pˆi, wi, ·) =
∑
i
wiWN\{i}
WN
(
ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
wj
WN\{i}
WN · ϕ ◦ sx˜j(pˆj)
)
=
∑
i
(
wiWN\{i}
WN
ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi)−
∑
j 6=i
wjWN\{j}
WN
·
wi
WN\{j}
WN · ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi)
)
=
∑
i
(
wiWN\{i}
WN
ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi)−
wiWN\{i}
WN
ϕ ◦ sx˜i(pˆi)
)
=0.
The above also shows that for each group from the random partition of (RP-SWME), ex-post budget balance is
satisfied. Thus, we also proved ex-post budget balance for (RP-SWME).
(d) Sybilproofness: In RP-SWME, any pair of agents with different beliefs have a positive probability to be
partitioned into a sub-group. Applying Lemma 2, at least one of them loses all his wager in the worst case. Thus, by
Definition 9, RP-SWME is PO.
Lemma 3. If a (randomized) wagering mechanism W is (weakly) budget-balanced, (weakly) incentive compatible,
Sybilproof, then the mechanismW∗ that first uniformly randomly pairs agents in groups of two and then runs mecha-
nismW for each group is still Sybilproof.
Proof. We prove the claim for the case that an agent is only allowed to create two identities. The claim holds in
general, as we can alway merge two identities into one without decreasing the payoff, following the result of the case
of two.
Fixing an arbitrary belief pi of agent i, we denote the E
W
i (pˆ,w) := EX∼pi,DW(pˆ,w,X)[Πi(pˆ,w, X = x)],
where DW(·) is the distribution specified by mechanismW . Suppose an agent i divides its wager wi into two wagers
wi1, wi2, and reports two predictions pˆi1, pˆi2 correspondingly. We have ∀pˆi1, pˆi2, wi1, wi2, pˆ−i,w−i, x,
EW∗i (pˆi1, pˆi2, pˆ−i, wi1, wi2,w−i)
=
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pˆi1, pˆj , wi1, wj) +
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pˆi2, pˆj , wi2, wj) +
1
N
(
EWi1 (pˆi1, pˆi2, wi1, wi2) + E
W
i2 (pˆi1, pˆi2, wi1, wi2)
)
≤
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pˆi1, pˆj , wi1, wj) +
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pˆi2, pˆj , wi2, wj) (W is (weakly) budget balance)
≤
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pi, pˆj , wi1, wj) +
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pi, pˆj , wi2, wj) (W is (weakly) incentive compatible)
≤
∑
j 6=i
1
N
EWi (pi, pˆj , wi, wj) (W is sybilproof)
≤
∑
j 6=i
1
N − 1
EWi (pi, pˆj , wi, wj) = E
W∗
i (pi, pˆ−i, wi,w−i)
Therefore,W∗ is sybilproof.
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(e) Anonymity: For SWME, this proof can follow from the fact that the randomness (error rate selection) in
SWME and tRP-SWME depends only on the reports and wagers of agents and do not depend on the identities of
agents and the fact that the expected net-payoffs of agents are the same with those of WSWM (Corollary 1), which
is anonymous (Lambert et al., 2008). RP-SWME only adds a random partition of agents in SWME and the partition
does not depend on the identities of agents. Thus, RP-SWME is also anonymous.
(f) Neutrality: For SWME, this proof can follow from the fact that the randomness (error rate selection) in SWME
and tRP-SWME depends only on the reports and wagers of agents and do not depend on the labeling of the outcomes
and the fact that the expected net-payoffs of agents are the same with those of WSWM (Corollary 1), which is neu-
tral (Lambert et al., 2008). RP-SWME only adds a random partition of agents in SWME and the partition does not
depend on the labeling of the outcomes. Thus, RP-SWME is also neutral.
(g) Non-arbitrage opportunity: Now we prove that SWME does not allow arbitrage opportunity. The idea is
simple and straight-forward: fix the set of prediction p−i and wagers w. First notice the fact that under each possible
realization x˜i, x˜−i can be any possible realizations. Since sX˜i=1(pi) and sX˜i=0(pi) have opposite monotonicity, we
know there does not exist an interval for risklessly predictions.
The above non-arbitrage opportunity is ex-post, but the arbitrage opportunity persists when agents evaluate the
conditional expectation of his score with respect to the random flipping step (which is the same as WSWM), which
remains a concern when each agent participates in multiple event forecasts. This concern will be resolved when we
apply the idea of surrogate wagering to the non-arbitrage wagering mechanism (NAWM). For details please refer to
Section 7.1 .
For RP-SWME, it runs SWME on each pair of agents after the random partition. Therefore, agents also have no
arbitrage opportunity.
(h) Pareto optimality: In RP-SWME, any pair of agents with different beliefs have a positive probability to be
partitioned into a sub-group. Applying Lemma 2, at least one of them loses all his wager in the worst case. Thus, by
Definition 9, RP-SWME is PO.
6.5 Wager with noisy ground truth
The above method also points out a way to implement a wagering mechanism with a noisy ground truth, as SWM is
able to remove the noise in outcomes in expectation. The ability to wager with noisy ground truth provides informative
information to agents who participated in a wagering mechanism immediately only when a noisy copy of outcome is
available. We present the key idea below, while not re-defining all properties w.r.t. Xˆ instead of X - the changes are
rather straight-forward.
Suppose we know a noisy estimate Xˆ onX , and denote the error rate of Xˆ as eˆ1, eˆ0 (which we know, and agents
trust us in knowing these two numbers), we will be able to reproduce our surrogate wager mechanism by plugging
Xˆ, eˆ1, eˆ0 into Eqn. (2), if we ignore the PO property for now. We similarly will have the wager violation issue pointed
out earlier - we however do not have the control of the error rates directly. An easy fix is via the following affine
transformation of the wagering scores: suppose under the worst case, the random flipping will incur−scale ·wi wager
score (net-payoff) with scale > 1. We can then rescale every agent’s wager score by 1/scale. Note the above affine
transformation does not affect the incentive and other properties of the original surrogate wagering mechanism, as
E
[
ϕ ◦ΠWSi (·))
]
= 1
scale
·E
[
ΠWSi (·))
]
.7 To achieve PO, we can further random partition agents into groups of two and
flip on Xˆ according to certain error rates eˆi0, eˆ
i
1 for each agent i. Let X˜i be the flipped outcome. We can establish the
7We didn’t apply the scaling in SWME when there exists other options, as the scaling will effectively decrease the expected
payment of each agent.
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error rates of X˜i w.r.t. the ground truthX and eˆ
i
0, eˆ
i
1 by following equations:
P(X˜i = 1|X = 0) =
∑
x∈{0,1}
P(X˜i = 1, Xˆ = x|X = 0)
=
∑
x∈{0,1}
P(X˜i = 1|Xˆ = x,X = 0) · P(Xˆ = x|X = 0)
= eˆi0 · (1 − eˆ0) + (1− eˆ
i
1) · eˆ0,
and similarly P(X˜i = 0|X = 1) = eˆi1 · (1 − eˆ1) + (1 − eˆ
i
0) · eˆ1. It’s easy to see that when eˆ1 + eˆ0 6= 1, we can tune
the error rates of X˜ via tuning eˆi1, eˆ
i
0. This step corresponds to the error selection step in SWME, i.e., Algorithm 3.
7 Extensions of SWM
We discuss a couple of useful extensions of SWM: i). one is instead of building on WSWM, we show the idea of
surrogate idea can also build upon another deterministic wagering mechanism NAWM. (ii). We extend our results to a
multi-outcome setting.
7.1 Surrogate NAWM
We note that the bias removal procedure adopted in SWM does not rely the specific underlying wagering mechanism
heavily. We demonstrate the idea with a non-arbitrage wagering mechanism (NAWM, (Chen et al., 2014))8.
Notice that since ΠNAi (·) is not linear in the surrogate scores of each agent, the budget balance argument is not as
easy as in the WSWM case. Nonetheless we notice the following fact proved in (Chen et al., 2014):
ΠNAi (pˆi, pˆ−i,w, X = x) = Π
WS
i (pˆi, pˆ−i,w, X = x)−Π
WS
i (
¯ˆpi, pˆ−i,w, X = x)
where ¯ˆpi denotes the average prediction from j 6= i. Then we can safely apply the surrogate idea to the first WSWM
scoring term:
ϕ ◦ΠNAi (pˆi, pˆ−i,w, X˜ = x˜) = ϕ ◦Π
WS
i (pˆi, pˆ−i,w, X˜ = x˜)−Π
WS
i (
¯ˆpi, pˆ−i,w, X = x)
This mechanism will enjoy the higher risk property introduced by surrogate wagering, as well as the non-arbitrage (in
conditional expectation) brought in by NAWM.
7.2 Multi-outcome events
For simplicity, our previous discussions focused largely on the binary outcome scenario. As promised, we now show
that our results extend to the non-binary events. Recall that there are M outcomes, denoting as [0, 1, 2, ...,M − 1].
Denote the following confusion matrix
C =


c0,0 c0,1 . . . c0,M−1
c1,0 c1,1 . . . c1,M−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cM−1,0 cM−1,1 . . . cM−1,M−1


and each entries cj,k indicates the flipping probability for generating a surrogate outcome: cj,k = Pr[X˜i = k|X = j].
The core challenge of this extension is to find an unbiased operator ϕ. Writing out the conditions for unbiasedness
(s.t. EX˜i|x[ϕ ◦ sX˜i=x˜i(pˆ)] = sx(pˆ).), we need to solve the following set of functions to obtain ϕ(·) (short-handing
8Though the randomization device already grants us the non-arbitrage property, we pick this mechanism for i. its simplicity for
presentation, as NAWM also extends from WSWM. ii. we will show in experiments later that we empirically observe higher risk
when applying this surrogate based randomized NAWM.
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ϕ ◦ sx(pˆ) as ϕx(pˆ)):
s0(pˆ) = c0,0 · ϕ0(pˆ) + c0,1 · ϕ1(pˆ) + · · ·+ c0,M−1 · ϕM−1(pˆ)
s1(pˆ) = c1,0 · ϕ0(pˆ) + c1,1 · ϕ1(pˆ) + · · ·+ c1,M−1 · ϕM−1(pˆ)
....
sM−1(pˆ) = cM−1,0 · ϕ0(pˆ) + cM−1,1 · ϕ1(pˆ) + · · ·+ cM−1,M−1 · ϕM−1(pˆ)
Denote by s(pˆ) = [s0(pˆ); s1(pˆ); ...; sM−1(pˆ)], and ϕ(pˆ) = [ϕ0(pˆ);ϕ1(pˆ); ...;ϕM−1(pˆ)]. Then the above equation
becomes equivalent with the following system of equation: s(pˆ) = C · ϕ(pˆ). Choose a C with full rank. For instance
when M > 2 we can set ∀j, cj,j =
1
2 , cj,k =
1
2(M−1) , k 6= j - not hard to verify that such a C is indeed full rank.
Then we are ready to solve for ϕ(p) as follows:
ϕ(pˆ) = C−1 · s(pˆ). (4)
With defining above unbiased surrogate operator, all other discussions generalize fairly straight-forwardly - such a ϕ
will give us the same equation as established in the lemma below for the non-binary event outcome setting:
Lemma 4. Define ϕ(·) as in Eqn. (4), and flip X˜i using C, x. Then EX˜i|x[ϕ ◦ sX˜i=x˜i(pˆ)] = sx(pˆ).
We include a detailed example of ϕ for three-outcome events below.
Example of ϕ for three-outcome events
Example 1. An example withM = 3. Suppose we flip the outcome using the uniform-error confusion matrix:
C =

 0.5 0.25 0.250.25 0.5 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.5

⇒ C−1 =

 3 −1 −1−1 3 −1
−1 −1 3


Therefore we obtain a closed-form of ϕ:
ϕ0(pˆ) = 3s0(pˆ)− s1(pˆ)− s2(pˆ)
ϕ1(pˆ) = −s0(pˆ) + 3s1(pˆ)− s2(pˆ)
ϕ2(pˆ) = −s0(pˆ)− s1(pˆ) + 3s2(pˆ)
8 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate LWS and RP-SWME with extensive simulations. We first compare the efficiency of
LWS and RP-SWME with that of other existing deterministic (weakly) incentive compatible mechanisms WSWM,
NAWM and DCA. The results show that the two randomized wagering mechanisms outperform the three deterministic
wagering mechanism. Then, we compare the variance of payoff and the probability of winning money within the two
randomized wagering mechanisms. The results show that RP-SWME is better than LWS in these two matrices.
8.1 Simulation Setup
We simulate both the binary events and the multi-outcome events. For binary events, we generated six sets of agents’
predictions and wagers according to the combinations of three different prediction models and two different wager
models. With a little abuse of notation, we denote that an event happens with probability q and that agent i believes
that the event to predict will happen with probability pi and will not happen with probability 1 − pi. We use three
models to generate predictions pi, i ∈ N :
1. Uniform model: For each event, pi is independently drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1].
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2. Logit-Normal model: This model assumes that pi, when being mapped to the real line by a logit function as
log
(
pi
1−pi
)
, is independently drawn from a Normal distributionN (log( q1−q )
1/α, σ2), i.e., pi ∼ Logit-Normal
(
log( q1−q )
1/α, σ2
)
.
q, α, σ2 are model parameters. This model is proposed and used to estimate the happening probability of the
event in (Satopää et al., 2014), where q is regarded as an estimator of the happening probability and α models
the under-confident effect on human forecasters. Based on a real prediction dataset over 1300 forecasters and 69
geopolitical events collected in (Satopää et al., 2014), this model outperforms most existing models to estimate
the happening probability of events, which leads us to believe this model a good alternate to generate prediction
data. In our simulations, we adopted α = 2, which best fits the aforementioned real prediction dataset, σ2 = 1,
and q is drawn uniformly from [0, 1] for each event.
3. Synthetic model: this synthetic model is introduced from a set of simulation studies in (Ranjan and Gneiting,
2010; Allard et al., 2012; Satopää et al., 2014). The model assumes that the happening probability of an event
to be predicted by N is given by q = Φ(
∑N
i=1 ui), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal distribution and ui is independently drawn fromN (0, 1). Each agent knows the true probability
generating model and ui but not uj , ∀j 6= i. Accordingly, each agent’s calibrated belief of the happening
probability of the event is given by pi = Φ(
ui√
2N−1 ).
We use two models to generate the wagers of agents:
1. Uniform model: All agents’ wagers are equal to 1.
2. Pareto model: This model assumes that the wager wi of agent i follows the Pareto distribution, which is often
adopted to model the distribution of wealth in a population. In the simulations of (Freeman et al., 2017), the
authors selected the shape parameter and scale parameter of the Pareto distribution as 1.16 and 1 correspond-
ingly, which is the distribution depicted as “20% of the population has 80% of the wealth”. We adopted the
same parameters for comparison purpose.
For events with multiple outcomes, we simulated three sets of data with the number of possible outcomes 3, 6, 9
correspondingly. In each set, we drew the predictions from uniform distribution over the whole probability space and
drew the wagers according to the Uniform model.
8.2 Comparison of efficiency of wagering mechanisms
We show that LWS and RP-SWME are more efficient than existing deterministic (weakly) incentive compatible
mechanisms WSWM, NAWM and DCA. We evaluate the efficiency by two metrics: Average individual risk and
Average money exchange rate.
Individual risk is the percent of wager that an individual agent can lose in the worst case w.r.t. the event outcome
and the randomness of the mechanisms. The average individual risk is an indicator of Pareto optimality, because the
average individual risk equal to 1 (i.e., no one can commit to secure a positive wager before the wagering game)
is a sufficient condition of Pareto optimality. Money exchange rate is the total amount of money exchanged in the
game after the outcome of a wagering mechanism is realized, divided by the total amount of wagers. Average money
exchange rate measures the efficiency of an average wagering game.
In our simulations, we vary the number of agents for 2 to 50 with a step of 2. For each number of agents, we
randomly generate 1000 events and the agents’ predictions and wagers for each of the six combinations of prediction
models and wager models, and take the average of individual risk and money exchange rate over the 1000 events.
When calculating the money exchange, we use the expectation of the money exchange over all possible outcomes
according to the happening probability of each outcome. This happening probability is either specified in the model
generating the predictions, or otherwise, drawn from a uniform distribution over the corresponding probability space.
In the simulations, both RP-SWME and LWS achieve the highest average individual risk (approximately 1)
under all conditions (# of outcomes, # of agents, prediction models, and wager models) we simulated (Figure 1, 2). In
contrast, the best of the deterministic mechanisms DCA, only achieves an approximate 1 average individual risk when
the wagers of agents are uniform and the number of participants is more than 30 (Figure 1a-1c). Its average individual
risk drops to 0.6 when the wagers of agents follows the Pareto distribution (Figure 1d-1f). This result shows that the
two randomized mechanisms effectively remove the opportunity for side bet and take use of all the wagers before the
outcome is realized.
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Figure 1: Average individual risk of each of five wagering mechanisms as a function of N under different
prediction and wager models
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Figure 2: Average individual risk of each of four mechanisms under events with multiple outcomes
LWS doubles the money exchange rate of the second best alternative, hitting a more than 80% money exchange
rate under all conditions we simulated (Figure 3, 4). On the other hand, RP-SWME also defeats the other two incen-
tive compatible deterministic wagering mechanisms in expected money exchange under all conditions we simulated
(Figure 3, 4). Meanwhile, it also outperforms DCA when the number of agents is small (Figure 3).
In particular, when the prediction follows the synthetic model, where the predictions are much closer to each
other as the number of participants increases, the money exchange rate of the two incentive compatible deterministic
wagering mechanisms, WSWM and NAWM converge to zero. However, the two randomized wagering mechanisms
still keep a large money exchange rate (Figure 3c, 3f).
8.3 Comparison of randomness properties of RP-SWME and LWS
In this section, we compare the standard variance of payoffs and the probability of not losing money of RP-SWME
and LWS. We evaluated these two metrics w.r.t. to the prediction accuracy, which is measured based on the distance
of a prediction to the outcome, i.e., Accuracy = 1− |x− pi|9.
9We use it as measurement of accuracy for two reasons: i. it is linear in prediction pi, ii. it has an inject to Brier Score
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Figure 3: Average money exchange rate of each of five wagering mechanisms as a function of N under
different prediction and wager models
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Figure 4: Average money exchange rate of each of four mechanisms under events with multiple outcomes
In the evaluation, we run 10000 wagering instances under these two mechanisms and recorded the prediction
accuracy of each agent in each instance and the corresponding net-payoff. Then, we group these agents into 10 groups
that correspond to 10 consecutive accuracy intervals. In each group, we calculate the standard variance and the percent
of agents winning money. For fair comparison, we normalize the net-payoff of each agent by its own wager.
We simulate binary events. We generate two set of simulated data. In both sets, we varied the number of agents
from 2 to 50 with a set of 2, and under each number, we generated 10000 instances. In each instance, the agents’
predictions are drawn from the Uniform model, while the wagers are drawn from the Uniform model in one set and
drawn from the Pareto model in the other set.
Our results show that under all conditions we simulate, RP-SWME has a much smaller variance in agents’ net-
payoff and the variance is steady across agents with different prediction accuracy. In contrast, the LWS has a much
larger variance in net-payoff, which increases with the prediction accuracy (Figure 5). On the other hand, RP-SWME
has a much larger probability of not losing money and this probability increases with the prediction accuracy, while
LWS has a much smaller such probability (Figure 6). In brief, while bothRP-SWME and LWS can effectively improve
the efficiency of wagering, RP-SWME provides much less uncertainty than LWS does and thus, may be regarded as
a more attractive alternative for deterministic wagering mechanisms.
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Figure 5: Std. variance of net-payoff as a function of
prediction accuracy: RP-SWME v.s. LWS
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Figure 6: Probability of winning money as a function
of prediction accuracy: RP-SWME v.s. LWS
9 Conclusion
We extend the design of wagering mechanism to its randomized space. We propose two of them: Lottery Wagering
Mechanisms (LWM) and Surrogate Wagering Mechanisms (SWM). We demonstrate the power of randomness by
theoretically proving that they both satisfy a set of desirable properties, including Pareto efficiency which is missing in
exiting wagering literature. We also carried out extensive experiments to support our theoretical findings. SWM is also
robust to noisy outcomes. In particular, as shown by simulations, surrogate wagering mechanisms have reasonably
small standard variance in agents’ payoff and low probability for agents to lose all their wagers.
References
D. Allard, A. Comunian, and P. Renard. Probability aggregation methods in geoscience. Mathematical Geosciences,
44(5):545–581, 2012.
G. W. Brier. Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of probability. Monthly Weather Review, 78(1):1–3, 1950.
T. Bylander. Learning linear threshold functions in the presence of classification noise. In Proceedings of the seventh
annual conference on Computational learning theory, pages 340–347. ACM, 1994.
Y. Chen, N. R. Devanur, D. M. Pennock, and J. W. Vaughan. Removing arbitrage from wagering mechanisms. In
Proceedings of the 15th ACM EC, pages 377–394. ACM, 2014.
R. Cummings, D. M. Pennock, and J. Wortman Vaughan. The possibilities and limitations of private prediction
markets. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 143–160. ACM,
2016.
R. Freeman and D. M. Pennock. An axiomatic view of the parimutuel consensus wagering mechanism. In Pro-
ceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pages 1936–1938.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2018.
R. Freeman, D. M. Pennock, and J. Wortman Vaughan. The double clinching auction for wagering. In Proceedings of
the 18th ACM EC, pages 43–60. ACM, 2017.
T. Gneiting and A. E. Raftery. Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and estimation. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 102(477):359–378, 2007.
D. J. Johnstone. The parimutuel Kelly probability scoring rule. Decision Analysis, 4(2):66–75, June 2007. ISSN
1545-8490. doi: 10.1287/deca.1070.0091. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1070.0091.
V. R. Jose, R. F. Nau, and R. L. Winkler. Scoring rules, generalized entropy and utility maximization. Working Paper,
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 2006.
D. M. Kilgour and Y. Gerchak. Elicitation of probabilities using competitive scoring rules. Decision Analysis, 1(2):
108–113, 2004. ISSN 1545-8490. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1030.0003.
18
N. S. Lambert, J. Langford, J. Wortman, Y. Chen, D. Reeves, Y. Shoham, et al. Self-financed wagering mechanisms
for forecasting. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM EC, pages 170–179. ACM, 2008.
N. S. Lambert, J. Langford, J. W. Vaughan, Y. Chen, D. M. Reeves, Y. Shoham, and D. M. Pennock. An axiomatic
characterization of wagering mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 156:389–416, 2015.
Y. Liu and Y. Chen. Surrogate scoring rules and a dominant truth serum for information elicitation. CoRR,
abs/1802.09158, 2018. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.09158.
J. E. Matheson and R. L. Winkler. Scoring rules for continuous probability distributions. Management Science, 22
(10):1087–1096, 1976.
N. Natarajan, I. S. Dhillon, P. K. Ravikumar, and A. Tewari. Learning with noisy labels. In Advances in neural
information processing systems, pages 1196–1204, 2013.
R. Ranjan and T. Gneiting. Combining probability forecasts. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B
(Statistical Methodology), 72(1):71–91, 2010.
V. A. Satopää, J. Baron, D. P. Foster, B. A. Mellers, P. E. Tetlock, and L. H. Ungar. Combining multiple probability
predictions using a simple logit model. International Journal of Forecasting, 30(2):344–356, 2014.
C. Scott. A rate of convergence for mixture proportion estimation, with application to learning from noisy labels. In
AISTATS, 2015.
R. L. Winkler. Scoring rules and the evaluation of probability assessors. Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 64(327):1073–1078, 1969.
J. Witkowski, R. Freeman, J. W. Vaughan, D. M. Pennock, and A. Krause. Incentive-compatible forecasting competi-
tions. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18), 2018.
19
